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HOUSEKEEPING CHORES OR THE
QUALITY EDUCATION: THE DILEMMAS
FACED BY LECTURES IN PUBLIC
UNIVERSITIES IN KENYA
Faculty Article by Zedekia Sidha and Justine Magutu

Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between task prioritization by university lecturers
and quality of university education. It is based on the assumption that universities, like
most street level bureaucracies, are chronically under-resourced for the work the public
expects them to do. The lecturers must therefore make a choice on which of their
numerous activities will be done first, which one second, and which will not be done all
together. In making these decisions it is assumed that they would make choices that are
in the best interest of the students and the university at large. However, lecturers also
have their own interests, which may not always be congruent with those of the students
and the University. This paper employs cross-sectional study design and the street level
bureaucratic theory to discuss how lecturers resolve the dilemma between pursuits of
theirs interests and those of the university in an environment of resource scarcity. The
paper concludes that in light of the resource scarcity, university lecturers prioritize
housekeeping chores over those activities that are core to the university mandate.

Introduction
University education is a priority for many countries in the world today (Mbirithi,
2013). In the current global environment, more and more jobs demand high skills and
qualifications which can only be attained through higher education. As observed by
Sifuna and Sawamura (2010), the key role of universities is to prepare individuals for
positions of responsibility in government, business and professions. Consequently,
university education plays a critical role in national development (Mbirithi, 2013). It is
increasingly seen as an investment that is expected to contribute to the national
prosperity in the long run (Yorke, 2000). This is particularly true for Africa due to the
need for highly trained people to formulate and implement policies, programs and
projects that can promote economic growth and development (Sifuna & Sawamura,
2010; Otieno, 2013).

However, in developing countries especially in Africa, the rapid expansion of higher
education is not matched with resources (OECD, 2008). Whereas there is an ever
increasing student enrolment the resources are either decreasing or remain stagnant
(Mbirithi, 2013). Many developing countries are struggling with the challenge of
preserving or improving the quality of higher education as the educational budgets are
compressed (World Bank, 1994). In Kenya, for instance, political decisions push
university managers to admit more students than the capacity of individual universities
in spite of decreased government funding (OECD, 2008). They are required to do more
with less resourced.
The rapid expansion of university education in Kenya has raised concerns over its
quality due to over enrolment, inadequate and out dated teaching and learning facilities
and low staff morale (Mbirithi, 2013). There is congestion in lecture theatres,
laboratories, libraries, and boarding facilities (Sifuna, 2010). According to the World
Bank (2000), ensuring that the quality of educational programs meets local and
international standards has become a great challenge in many developing countries.
Research by faculty has dropped due to heavy teaching responsibilities brought by the
rising student numbers. Quality university education implies that it has to meet both
local and international standards, be competitive, transform and empowering the lives of
the student (Schindler et al. 2015).
In their September 2015 report titled “Kenya’s Education Achievement and Challenges”
the World Bank raised concerns over the quality of graduates being produced by
Kenyan universities (The Daily Nation, 2016). According to the aforementioned report,
the education system in the country is producing graduates without knowledge, skills,
and competence to achieve its long term goals such as Vision 2030. An earlier study by
Inter-University Council for East Africa (IUCEA) had observed that nearly 51% to 63% of
the graduates in East Africa were half baked (not fully trained) and lacked the required
skills for the job market (Sylvester, 2014). In particular such graduates are deficient in
both numerical and essay capabilities (Mohamedbhai, 2014). As a result of this, most
Kenyan graduates have remained jobless irrespective of the high level of human
resource requirements for the country to meet its development goals. To a large extent
this sorry state of affairs has been blamed on inadequate funding for educational
institution in the country. The lack of funding has consequently affected the lecturers
who are pivotal to the performance of the universities this study sought to find out how
lecturers deal with the dilemma over chronic resource scarcity and public expectation of
high quality graduates.
The study is underpinned by the street level bureaucratic theory (SLBT) developed by
Lipsky 0to, who discussed policy implementation failure from a bottom up perspective to
implementation research. According to SLBT, street level bureaucracies including
schools, police services, welfare departments, and lower courts and criminal justices
systems are characterized by chronic resource scarcity. Meaning the resources
available for service provision in these departments are always far less than the
mandate of the department both in terms of the number of clients and the range of
activities for which the department is responsible. To cope with this situation, frontline

workers in these departments ration their services both in terms of the number of clients
to be served and the number of activities to be implemented. While the expectation is
that discretionary decision over which services to offer and who to offer a service are
done in the best interest of policy makers, street level bureaucrats normally have
interest of their own including the desire to make more income, increase comfort and
prestige of their jobs, as well as reduce risks associated with it. If they are not monitored
they can use their discretionary powers to undermine policy implementation.
It is against this background that this study sought to find out the effects of discretionary
choices employed by lecturers on which of the tasks within their jobs to allocate more
time and the effects of the same on quality of education. It has employed a crosssectional study design composed of questionnaire survey, focus group discussions, and
key informant interviews as well as document reviews. The primary data was collected
from 40 lecturers teaching at Rongo University, Kenya and quality assurance officials in
the university as well as those working at the Ministry of Education. The University had
a total of 75 lecturers at the time of the study. Secondary data on the other hand was
collected from published and none published materials relating to quality of university
education.
The study was guided by the main study questions which is the relationship between
chronometric discretion on the quality of university education. The term chronometric
discretion is used in this study to refer to discretionary choices made by lecturers on
how to prioritize their limited time against overwhelming workload. The specific
questions were: 1) What is the correlation between performance monitoring and
chronometric discretion? 2) What is the relationship between mentality energy
requirement of an activity and chronometric discretion? 3) What is the relationship
between students’ declared interests and chronometric discretion? 4) What is the
relationship between the desire to make more income and chronometric discretion and;
the relationship between the university goals and chronometric discretion?

Understanding street level bureaucratic theory
Lipsky (2010) defined street-level bureaucrats as those public service workers who
directly interact with citizens in the course of their work and who have substantial
discretion in the execution of the same. Typically he noted that these include teachers,
police officers, judges, social workers, public health workers, among others (Lipsky,
2010). Lipsky (2010) asserted that decision making process in street-level
bureaucracies are normally characterized with uncertainty on one hand due to the
unpredictable nature of human persons which is the subject matter of the bureaucrats’
decisions and on the other hand the requirement of full enforcement of the law. For
instance, a traffic act requires that all people within a moving locomotive must wear seat
belts. There may be a case, however, of a pregnant woman who is just about to give
birth and the seat belt available cannot fit her. The police officer manning the road block
would certainly be faced with a dilemma on whether to make an arrest for the observed
traffic law violation or not (Lipsky, 2010).

It is noteworthy, however, that the street-level bureaucrats’ dilemma not only arises from
the incompleteness of the law but also the fact that they keep changing “in most welfare
departments, regulations are encyclopedic yet at the same time, they are constantly
changed” (Lipsky, 2010, p.14). These pieces of information are never readily available
for the street-level bureaucrats in a usable manner despite the fact that their case loads
tend to be high and encounters episodic. They are thus under constant pressure to
make decisions without trying search for relevant information about the case brought
before them (Lipsky, 2010). Additionally street-level bureaucrats work with fewer
resources than the requirements of their mandates. The demand for goods and services
offered by street-level bureaucracies tend to be much higher than its supply. This
demand keeps on increasing with less than proportionate increases in the departmental
budgets for the street-level bureaucracies. “In the case of the police for example, the
society expects them to intervene in many more social conflicts-interracial violence,
assaults on blacks, family disputes, juvenile justice than it was 40 years ago” (Lipsky,
2010, p. 34). Additionally, the street-level bureaucrats rarely have clearly defined
performance objectives. Most public service goals tend to be overambitious without
clearly defined achievable and realistic targets (Hill & Hupe, 2008). Additional they tend
to be vague as a result of the conflicts that are embedded during the formulation
process. It is common for the legislature to pass conflicts on a given policy problem it is
unable to resolve to the administrative level for resolution. Lack of clearly defined
performance goals and measurement make it difficult for the street-level bureaucrats to
prioritize on which issues to expend their energies. It also makes it difficult for managers
to supervise their supervisee given that there is nothing to hold them to account for in
their performance or lack of it (Lipsky, 2010).
Finally the job performance of the street level bureaucrats is also affected by their
relationships with the clients, “the clients in street-level bureaucracies are nonvoluntary” (Lipsky, 2010, p. 54). Street level bureaucracies provide essential services.
Most clients who seek services in the street-level bureaucracies have no alternative
sources of the same service. There is no private police station for which victims of road
rage or domestic violence can seek services of law enforcement. The result effect of
this is that the clients are unable to punish the street-level bureaucrats by seeking the
services offered from the alternative service providers as it would be the case, for the
clients, in the private sector (Lipsky, 2010).
Coupled with the aforementioned, the street-level bureaucrats normally have interests
of their own which are sometimes incongruent with those of the agencies they work for
and those of their supervisors, “At the very least workers have interest in minimizing
danger and discomfort of the job and maximising income and personal gratification”
(Lipsky, 2010, p.18). In the public policy implementation process, the street level
bureaucrats tend to pursue their own interests including that of increasing their
autonomy and discretion as opposed to those of the agency in which they are
employed. The only time they comply with organization rules and pursue its objectives
is when such rules are backed with sanctions. For the police men however, even in
cases where the organisational regulations are backed with sanctions compliance may

be low given that the police inspectors are not capable to be with patrolmen all the time
as to detect and punish wrong doing (Lipsky, 2010).
In the process of reducing case load, the street-level bureaucrats ration the services of
their agencies. They prioritize tasks so that they are able to concentrate on a limited
number of selected clients, cases, and solutions. In the processes of ranking tasks for
which to concentrate, street-level bureaucrats prioritize those program activities that are
routine in nature as opposed to those which are complex. They give priority to those
program areas where the program recipients are demanding action other than those
that involve prevention, research, or outreach. Additionally they cluster the clients into
various categories. Among these categories they prioritize those who are to benefit and
those who will not (Hupe, Hill, & Buffat, 2016).

House Keeping Chores and Discretion and Quality of
University Education Lecturers Working Conditions
Resource availability is an important determinant of quality of education especially an
appropriate lecture –student ratio, adequate learning facilities, well-equipped libraries
and access to internet resources. According to Yin and Wai (1997) university education
is comparable to a living organism with input,throughput, and output. The same
authors note that to get quality education one must invest in both the input and
throughput elements of the system. To this end the study respondents were asked to
rate their access to the following facilities (see Table 1).

As can be noted in Table 1, most of the lecturers did not have enough facilities to the
jobs which they are employed to do. This can plausibly be explained by the fact that
while there has been exponential growth in both the number of universities in Kenya
and the number of students enrolled in the same, this growth has not been
accompanied with growth in the amount of funding. Notably while the number of
students enrolled in public universities were 1,000 at the time of independence today
there are approximately 276,349 university students in Kenya (Munene, 2016, p. 18).
The resultant effects of these shortfalls in funding have resulted into high student
lecturer’s ration. In Rongo University for instance there are only 75 lectures with a

student population of over 6,000 students. In light of the limited number of staff
members in the institution, nearly every academic staff has been assigned the role of
discipline coordinator. The roles of discipline coordinators include; sourcing for part-time
lecturers in the particular discipline, allocating classes for all the lecturers in the
discipline, monitoring teaching, organizing for both internal and external exams
moderation, as well as ensuring that all exams are invigilated and fully processed. Out
of these 25 are holding management positions with limited teaching workload. This
finding is collaborated in an earlier study by Kimathi and Henry (2014, p. 345) that
observed that: “in many of the Kenyan universities the following were common, lecturers
teaching up to 36 hours per week, lecturers having no offices, overcrowded lecture
rooms, less contact hours for school based students and limited library facilities” (p.
345). Such poor working conditions often lead to poor quality education.

Lecturers coping mechanisms
Coping mechanisms refers to behavioral efforts employed by frontline workers during
their interaction with the project beneficiary to master, tolerate or reduce external and
internal demands and as well as conflicts that arise from such service delivery
(Tummers, Bekkers, Vink, & Musheno, 2014). It occurs when frontline public service
workers are faced with high loads as well as conflicting demands from their employers,
their clients, the general public, and sometimes their personal values. Some of the
coping mechanisms include rule bending, rule breaking, routinizing as well as rationing
(Lipsky, 2010).
Faced with high caseloads, lectures in public universities ration services by prioritizing
their work schedules. The study observed that on average the ranks were as follows: 1)
administrative duties, 2) exam processing, 3) teaching, 4) research supervision, 5)
research and publications, 6) community outreach, 7) curriculum development, and 8)
fundraising/ writing research proposals. This data was further juxtaposed by data on
performance monitoring and the respondents were asked to state which aspects of their
jobs are highly monitored.

As illustrated in Table 2, there is a strong relationship between the activities being
monitored and those that lecturers prioritize their implementation. This is evidenced by
the fact that the observed p-value = 0.04583 is less than the acceptable p-value of 0.05
at the confidence interval of 95% employed in this study.
With regard to how monitoring is done, the study established that administrative duties
are monitored through compliance to the university almanac (calendar). In each senate
meeting the heads of departments are requested to report on how they are doing as far
as following the almanac is concerned. The head of department pass the same
information down to the discipline coordinators who are tasked to ensure that senate
directives are followed. Exam processing is aligned to the university almanac. Teaching
on the other hand is monitored through the class attendance. There is no structured
way of monitoring other university lecturers’ duties. They are however evaluated at the
end of the year during performance review sessions. Students are also regularly given
evaluation forms to assess the performance of lecturers. Additionally the external
examiner periodically writes a report on how the exams were set and the way students
answered the questions. As it pertains to sanctions and rewards associated with the
performance evaluation system, it was observed that the annual performance reviews
rarely affect the lecturer’s salaries; and due to the fact that most of them are employed
on a permanent basis these reviews do not affect their employment status. Scripts from
Focus Group Discussions FGDs indicated however that lecturers fear external
examiners reports because they are normally read in public and a bad report may
reduce ones standing and respect among his peers. Students’ end of semester
evaluation reports is rarely discussed with individual lecturers and therefore they do not
know what and do not care what it contains. To my mind, this the greatest threat to the
quality of university education. When the feedback from the end product users are not
put into consideration during planning processes and product decision making
processes that are concerned with product quality then it is highly unlikely that the

product will meet the customer specifications. This phenomenon is however not
surprising; according to Lipsky (2010), clients in the street level bureaucracies are not
the main reference group for the street level bureaucrats. This stems from the fact that
their consumption of goods and services offered in the street level bureaucracies is not
voluntary in nature. The street level bureaucracies offer unique services which cannot
be found anywhere else. With regard to public universities, most students tend to be
from poor families who cannot afford education in the private universities. They are thus
very happy that they got a chance in the public university. Scripts from the student
leaders’ FGD also indicate that students rarely want to antagonize lecturers because
they fear that they might victimize and fail them. This notwithstanding, as will be seen in
the other section of the report, complaints from the students, whether issued individually
or as a group, are taken very seriously by the universities.
Having noted that the university lecturers prioritize activities whose implementation
progress is monitored by the University, the study also sought to find out how the
lecturers prioritize their work in terms of amount of intellectual energy is required to
execute it.

From Table 3 it is noticeable that there is a significant relationship between prioritization
of duties and the level of mental energy required for the activity. This is evident from the
fact that the observed p-value = 0.03676 is less than the acceptable p-value of 0.05 at
the confidence interval of 95%. As indicated by the correlation value, which is rho 0.7619048 the relationship is negative. Consequently lecturers do not prioritize jobs that
require a great deal f mental energy in the course of their jobs. This finding is consistent
with that of Hupe et al. (2016) who observed that in light of high work loads street level
bureaucrats give credence to task that are routine in nature over those that requires
research and innovation.

The other area identified by Lipsky (2010) as a strong determiner for street level
bureaucratic discretion is the desire to make more income. To this end the respondents
were asked to rank their activities in terms of the potentiality to give them additional
income. The data generated was compared to the data that had been collected on how
they prioritize their work schedules. Table 4 provides data on the test of correlation
between prioritization of work schedules and rank of activities in terms of the potentiality
to provide additional income.

From Table 4 it is observable that there is no significant relationship between the time
spent on activities and potential income derived from such activities. This evident by the
fact that the observed p-value = 0.2992 is higher than the acceptable p-value = 0.05 at
the confidence interval of 95% employed in this study. The failure to reject the null
hypothesis in this section of the study has been brought about by the fact that different
lecturers earn their income from different activities. Whereas those in administrative
positions such as the deans, directors, as well as heads of departments are paid what is
called responsibility allowances some positions such as discipline coordinators do not
get paid any allowance. Therefore those that are not paid any allowance feel that their
time would be better spent elsewhere where they can make extra income like part-time
lecturing in private universities or consulting for non-governmental and governmental
organizations It was equally difficult to get a representative ranking of community
service and curriculum development. This stems from the fact the some of these events
carry with them a per diem packages while other do not.
Street level bureaucratic discretion is also said to be determined by public pressure (Hill
& Hupe, 2008) to that end the head of departments were asked to rank the lecturers’
activities in terms of the potentiality that students will complain if the lecturers in their
departments did not complete such activities. The Table 5 provides data on the rank
between students declared interests and work prioritization.

From Table 5 it is noticeable that there is a significant relationship between prioritization
of duties and the declared interests by the students. This is evident from the fact that
the observed p-value = 0.03676 is less than the acceptable p-value of 0.05 at the
confidence interval of 95%. As indicated by the correlation value is rho 0.7619048 which
means that the relationship is positive. One of the possible explanations for
prioritization of job task that relates to students expressed interests is the fact that
failure to do the same would attract public outcry. This finding is collaborated by those
of Hill and Hupe (2008) which indicates that one of the considerations made by street
level bureacrates in rationing the implementation activities is the extent to which failure
to implement such activities would result in a negative public pressure.
Finally, Lipsky (2010) referred to the street level bureaucrats as the ultimate policy
makers due to the fact that sometimes they pursue interest which are different from
those of the policy makers and bureaucratic executives thereby undermining the policy
implementation process. The table below provides data of the rank of correlations
between prioritization of work schedules by lecturers and university strategic objectives.

As illustrated in Table 6 there is no significant relationship between prioritization of
duties and university strategic objectives. This is evident from the fact that the observed
p-value = 0.6646 is greater than the acceptable p-value of 0.05 at the confidence
interval of 95%. It is worth noting however that the correlation value which is rho 0.1904762 the relationship is negative. To this end the study rejects the null hypothesis.
From the discussions it is deducible that university lectures prioritize work tasks that
there is pressure either from students or the university management for their completion
and those that are routine in nature. They rarely give priority to those job tasks that are
intellectually demanding and their task ranking in order of priority is by no way related to
the university strategic objectives.

Conclusion
Taking into consideration the objectives, findings and discussions, the study arrived at
the following conclusions. To begin with, lecturers work in an environment of resource
scarcity. Most of the study respondents complained that the work schedules were
overwhelming and they did not have adequate resources to accomplish tasks
demanded from them by the university. In light of this challenge, lecturers are forced to
prioritize their work so as to meet the urgent needs of their departments. These
decisions are largely influenced by public pressure, desire to make more income and
not necessary the desire to improve the quality of education.
The study observed positive correlations between performance monitoring and time
allocation for various job tasks. The responsibilities, which were closely monitored by
the university, were allocated more time for implementation in comparison to those,
which were not monitored. The same experience was reported for the activities, which
were accompanied by real or potential pressure from students for their

accomplishments. A contrary experience was reported for job tasks that were
intellectually demanding. Most of the lecturers’ time in the university was reportedly
spent on routine housekeeping chores as opposed to those that required research and
innovation. For instance, the average number of publication by the respondents during
the last academic year was one and only 10% had attracted a research grant. Finally,
the study did not find any association between the university objectives and
chronometric discretion employed by lecturers. While the university wishes to increase
its funding base, attracting more research grants, as well as its academic ranking
through the production of various publications.

Solutions and Recommendations
With reference to the discussion and conclusions, the study hereby proposes some
recommendations. To begin, the university should relate its monitoring and evaluation
system to its strategic objectives. The study observed that most of the activities in the
critical pathway to the university policy objectives were not being implemented due to
lack of follow up by management. For instance, while there is a motoring tool for class
attendance and exam processing, none is available for research grants and
publications. The common assumption within the teaching fraternity is that the university
does not deem activities like research and publication that are not monitored, important.
Additionally, the university is yet to come up with a performance management system.
All the staff members normally use the performance generic performance contract
documents from the ministry. Most lecturers sign them as a statutory requirement other
than a document for performance management and the same applies to the
supervisors. No measurable performance objectives are discussed with the staff
members at the beginning of every year. No midterm review applies. The only
reasonable performance reviews are conducted when one requests them as a
prerequisite for promotion. However, in light of the fact that there is no performance
monitoring data, it is highly unlikely that such reviews will be effective.
Efforts should be made to improve the lecturers’ working environments. The data from
FGD scripts noted that the lecturers feel appreciated by the university leadership.
Notably, none academic workers tend to have better working spaces and facilities in
comparison to academic. There were also complains about the frequency and nature of
communication between the university leadership and the academic staff.

Future Research Directions
In view of the summary, conclusions, and implications, the study gives direction for
future research. The study failed to make conclusive statements over the relationship
between the desire to make more money and quality of university education due to a
sampling error. This relationship should therefore be retested. Additionally, it was not
within the scope of this study to investigate all the aspects of street level discretion
exercises by lecturers and their effects on the quality of university education. To that

end, the study proposes that future research efforts should investigate aspects of street
level bureaucratic discretion that have not been investigated by this study.
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